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Introduction
On Monday, April 18, 2016, Malta’s House of Representatives observed a minute’s silence as a sign of respect for some 400 migrants that had been 
reported to have drowned in the Mediterranean earlier that day.2 Many others, I 
presume, some living around the Mediterranean and others living elsewhere, have 
paused in silence not knowing what to say but wanting somehow to express their 
grief at a tragedy of such magnitude. Unfortunately, such incidents are following 
each another in very quick succession and we are losing count on how often these 
incidents are happening.3 When we turn from numbers to faces, the tragedy 
touches us more deeply. The heading of a report by Reuters of a recent incident 
shows the extent and expresses the depth of the ongoing tragedy. “Drowned baby 
picture,” it reads, “captures a week of tragedy in the Mediterranean” (referring 
to the week of May, 22-29, 2016). The picture shows a baby in the hands of 
its rescuer who described his experience very poignantly: “I took hold of the 
forearm of the baby and pulled the light body protectively into my arms at once, 
 
 
 1 Rev. Prof. George Grima is professor of moral theology and former dean of the Faculty 
of Theology at the University of Malta. His areas of specialization include fundamental moral 
theology, economics and theology, and human rights and social ministry.
 2 http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20160418/local/house-in-minutes-silence-
after-latest-migrants-tragedy.609305.
 3 UNCHR reports that 5,083 have drowned or gone missing in the Mediterranean in 2016, 
90% of these deaths occurring along the central Mediterranean route. International Organization 
for Migration, Missing Migrants Project at https://missingmigrants.iom.int/mediterranean.
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as if it were still alive ... It held out its arms with tiny fingers into the air, the sun 
shone into its bright, friendly but motionless eyes.”4 
The title of this article evokes two images of the immigrant. One is implied 
the other is explicit, although conveyed in a symbolic manner. Those immigrants 
who are lucky enough to survive a very perilous journey from home to what 
they hope to be a promising land have to make the painful and yet crucial step 
of crossing the border. Countries have borders and the gates are often tightly 
closed and heavily guarded. The expression “immigrants at the gate” conjures 
up a picture of the immigrant standing on firm and solid ground, unlike the 
shaky and at times turbulent sea, but with no or very little chance of moving 
further on. The fate of immigrants at the gate is surely a matter of concern to 
the individual and collective conscience. It may not always be the case that those 
inside are being altogether indifferent to those waiting ouside. But the religious 
and moral challenge remains, because the immigrants at the gate rightly expect 
that the gate at which they stand would be that of mercy and justice.
At the liturgical inauguration of the Jubilee Year, the Pope intones a verse 
from one of the psalms, “Open to me the gates of justice, that I may enter through 
them and give thanks to the Lord,”5 before pushing open the bronze doors in 
St Peter’s Basilica. This is symbolically a very significant ritual. It symbolizes 
the unity in difference between justice and mercy. There is a threshold which 
one needs to cross before entering into an experience of a merciful God. This is 
justice. Listening to the voice of justice heightens our awareness of the dignity 
of the other, and strengthens our resolve to act in his or her regard in a dignified 
manner. In turn, our experience of a merciful God enlightens and enables us to 
respond to the needs of one another in surprisingly new ways. 
How can this theological vision help us to respond sensitively and, at the 
same time, effectively to the plight of immigrants at our borders? Evidently, the 
problem of immigration, having become so vast and complex in recent years, 
is very difficult to solve, especially because it calls for substantial changes in 
attitude and behaviour. This article will be focusing on one central point, namely, 
that our response to the immigrants knocking on our doors reflects not only 
the kind of society we would like to live in but also the kind of persons we wish 
to be. We shall not be discussing issues relating to immigration policy, even if 
these issues have quite an important ethical component, and surely need to be 
addressed, if anything, because concretely much depends on what policies are 
in force at the time.6 The argument of this article will be developed in three 
 4 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-baby-idUSKCN0YL18P.
 5 Ps118:18.
 6 For ethical issues relating to control over immigration and citizenship for immigrants, see 
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steps: (i) the immigration problem in the context of a just and merciful social 
environment, (ii) overcoming indifference through compassion, and (iii) justice 
as a disposition and norm.
A Just and Merciful Social Environment
The kind of social environment that develops within and across countries 
depends very much on the measures that are taken by the State on a national 
level, and by the States collectively at an international level. States not only 
control borders but dictate whether and under what conditions immigrants 
can settle in a particular country. Indeed, these are very important and crucial 
matters regarding immigration. What society, as distinct from the State, can do 
in this regard is to approve immigration policies or protest against them as being 
either too tight or too loose. Yet social approval or protest can promote a more 
human society in the long run, if these elements are rooted in a sense of justice, 
ensuring that policies are actually responding to what people, whoever they are, 
rightly expect as human beings. It is precisely this broader perspective that a 
society needs to cultivate in order to create a social environment which would 
enable everyone, including the immigrant, to live a dignified life. 
The initiatives that are being taken by the churches and a fairly wide range 
of non-governmental organizations show that although States do actually play 
a decisive role with regard to immigration, other social actors are playing a 
key role too. St John Paul II 7 and, especially, Pope Benedict XVI8 have shown 
how important it is for society not to be unduly constrained by the logic that 
we associate with the State and the market. The State proceeds on the logic of 
legal obligation. The market operates on the logic of exhange. People, however, 
know or are capable to know another kind of logic. They are or, at least, can 
be familiar with a way of reasoning that reflects better their profound needs as 
human beings. This is the logic of the gift which Benedict XVI elaborates in 
his encyclical Caritas in Veritate. This logic of welcoming and giving is usually 
nurtured within civil society as distinct from the State and the market. Civil 
society stands for that social space where people are not simply exercising their 
rights and hopefully fulfilling their responsibilities but where they are showing 
Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1983), 31-63. For ethical considerations of current immigration policies and a well argued 
position in support of open borders, see Joseph H.Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2015).
 7 John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Centesimus Annus (1991), no. 35. 
 8 Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter Caritas in Veritate (2009), nos. 34-42.
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concern for one another, even when the other is a foreigner or, more precisely in 
our context, an immigrant. This social space, unfortunately, can be contaminated 
by negative and, much worse, hostile feelings. For this reason, it needs to be 
purified to serve effectively as a nurturing and nourishing ground for a way of 
thinking and living that is conducive to a really human environment, where 
everyone can enjoy not only respect for his or her dignity but feel accepted and 
loved. 
There has been a number of thinkers in recent years9 who have made a strong 
plea for an inclusive society in the widest possible sense. This would be a society 
that is inclusive, first of all, in terms of justice. Buiding a “just society” implies an 
appropriate set of dispositions and structures that protect and promote each and 
everyone’s rights (the other being envisaged as a bearer of rights and as someone 
other than oneself ). The underlying idea in this concept of society is that of 
“respectful distance” between oneself and the other. But there is another, equally 
fundamental, aspect of social life. In fact, human societies are kept alive through 
a continuing sense of fellowship. A “just as well as a loving society” involves 
dispositions and structures that are conducive to living not merely with, but for 
each other.
Theologians, who have written recently on immigration, have been generally 
focusing on the theme of hospitality.10 Indeed, this is a spiritually and morally very 
resourceful theme which has lost much of its theological meaning in being applied, 
almost exclusively, to the tourism industry. Even if one may argue that it is ethically 
much more appropriate to look at the tourist not as a purely service consumer but as 
a guest to be welcomed and made to feel at home in the host country, “hospitality” 
 9 Michael J. Sandel claims that John Rawls’ sentimental conception of community, while 
more adequate than an instrumental conception, is still inadequate, and argues for a constitutive 
conception of community “where the members find themselves commonly situated ‘to begin 
with,’ their communality consisting less in relationships they have entered than in attachments 
they have found.” See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 152. Paul Ricoeur defines the aim of our life together as 
living the “the ‘good life’ with and for others, in just institutions.” See Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as 
Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey ( Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 172. 
 10 See Christine D. Pohl, Making Room: Recovering Hospitality as a Christian Tradition 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999); Luke Bretherton, Hospitality as Holiness: Christian 
Witness amid Moral Diversity (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006); A Promised Land, A Perilous Journey: 
Theological Perspectives on Migration, ed. Daniel D. Groody and Gioacchino Campese (Notre 
Dame, ID: University of Notre Dame Press, 2008); Susanna Snyder, Asylum Seeking, Migration 
and Church (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012); Luis Rivera Pagan, Essays from the Margins (Cambridge: 
Lutterworth, 2015); Fleur S. Houston, You Shall Love the Stranger As Yourself, The Bible, Refugees 
and Asylum (London: Routledge, 2015).
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cannot convey fully its deeper significance, if it is mainly seen and practised in a 
commercial context. It has certainly been a good move on the part of theologians to 
go back to the roots which this theme has in both the Old and the New Testament, 
and try to recover its richer meaning from within a religious tradition.
In the Biblical tradition the “alien” is one who is in a vulnerable situation 
and whom God wants his people to welcome.11 “The alien who resides with you 
shall be as the citizen among you; you shall love the alien as yourself, for you 
were aliens in the land of Egypt: I am the Lord your God” (Lev 19: 33-34). The 
memory of the suffering of the Jewish people in Egypt situates the ethic of the 
golden rule - give unto others what you wish others give to you - in a narrative 
where God is liberating his people from slavery and giving them a land where 
they can settle and live in freedom. Hospitality acquires a much deeper meaning 
when it is seen and practised with such a narrative in mind, remembering that 
the fate of the other has been at some time one’s own fate as well. In his address 
to the US Congress, Pope Francis has surely opened a new, even if it should have 
been so obvious, dimension to the public debate on immigration in the United 
States, when he invited the audience to remember that: “We, the people of this 
continent, are not afraid of foreigners, because most of us were foreigners.”12 
Remembering where we have been in the past or considering where we may 
be in the future may help us recognize that we do share something in common 
with each other, as we are all vulnerable to so many risks in life. This may also 
help us overcome, as Pope Francis said in his address to the US Congress, our fear 
of the other. In this case, however, the liberation from fear is difficult to achieve, 
because social phenomena like immigration, especially on a relatively large scale, 
as is taking place today, are likely to generate a cultural and social environment 
where a fear-based way of thinking and behaving vis-a-vis the other may become 
increasingly more dominant. As Susanna Snyder argues, “fear among established 
populations is arguably the most significant underlying cause of the challenges 
and struggles faced by asylum seekers.”13 These fears assume different forms, “from 
the politico-cultural (seeing migrants as a threat to the nation-state and national 
identity), to those surrounding economic and welfare resources (seeing migrants 
as competition for healthcare, jobs, housing, etc.), and those relating to security 
(seeing migrants as terrorists).”14 Such fears are expressed in “stereotyping and 
 11 For a study of the way in which the Old Testament understands the “stranger” or the “alien” 
see Houston, You Shall Love the Stranger, 69-92.
 12 Address to the US Congress (p.3) available at, https://w2.vatican.va/content/.../papa-
francesco_20150924_usa-us-congress.html.
 13 Snyder, Asylum-Seeking, 13.
 14 Ibid.
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scapegoating, media hostility, violence towards asylum seekers and increasingly 
harsh policies and practices of control and deterrence.”15 
Snyder speaks of an “ecology of fear”16 to capture the nature of the cultural 
and social dynamics of the fear of immigrants at our gates. Religion does not 
always help to warn against the destructive forces of such an ecology for social 
relationships. Sometimes it endorses these forces, making it more difficult to 
acknowledge the deceptive and the potentially destructive character of social 
relationships motivated by fear. Using the biblical sources in a critical manner, she 
explores in particular the books of Ezra and Nehemiah as examples of a way of 
thinking and behaving that are shaped by an ecology of fear, generating negative, 
sometimes even hostile, responses towards the stranger. One can use these texts 
to learn how religion can be infected by the anxieties and apprehension that we 
feel at certain junctures of our life or history. In fact, the authors of these books 
and the contemporary Israelite community were living in post-exilic socio-
historical circumstances, that were prone to foster an ecology of fear.17 
Proper immigration policies and adequate legislation are certainly required 
for a society to be truly open and hospitable to immigrants at its gates. But there 
is still a more fundamental question to ask: What image of the other do we have 
in our mind and in our heart? This question acquires a new significance and 
poses a new moral and spiritual challenge, if we are not talking of the other who 
belongs to our community but of the other who does not belong and has come 
possibly to stay with us. The problem would not be exclusively or, even mainly, 
that of defending our borders and protecting our rights as citizens of a particular 
country. It would be rather that of creating sustainable human relationships. 
The most effective system of self-defence is one that is built on mutual trust and 
nourishes mutual trust. The real challenge is for people to learn to go beyond a 
self-defensive attitude especially towards those who appear to their untutored 
imagination as a threat to security and well-being, by trying to build what Snyder 
calls an “ecology of faith.”18 Turning to the stories of Ruth in the Old Testament 
and the Syro-Phoenician woman in the Gospel of Mark (Mk 7:24-30), Snyder 
shows that the Scriptures contain stories that can actually inspire new ways of 
seeing and welcoming the immigrants at our gates as people who can bring hope 
rather than fear and life rather than death.
Stories, like those of Ruth and the Syro-Phoenician woman, show the role 
that virtues play in the making of a person with a positive attitude towards the 
 15 Ibid.
 16 Ibid., 139-162.
 17 Ibid., 147.
 18 Ibid., 163-196.
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stranger. Hospitality is a virtue which can be acquired through the cultivation of 
mercy and justice as two virtues that are not opposed but related to each other. 
Quoting Augustine,19 Aquinas says that mercy is regulated by reason (and hence 
a virtue), when it is practised in such a way that justice is safeguarded. 20 Justice 
and mercy (which is a form of love) are complementary ethical principles and 
they are both basic for a society that would like to welcome the immigrants at 
its gates. 
How can mercy move us to reach out to people, such as immigrants, who are 
passing through a difficult and painful phase in their life ? In what sense is the 
cultivation of a sense of justice essential for healthy relationships with people, 
like immigrants, whom we may perceive more as a liability than an asset and 
rather as a threat than a promise? Within the limits of this article it is possible 
only to make some observations in answer to these questions. 
Compassion: Not indifferent but Merciful 
One way of understanding mercy is to see it in relation to its opposite. Its 
opposite seems to be cruelty. What does cruelty mean? The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary of Current English defines cruelty as “indifferent to, delighting in, 
another’s pain.”21 If indifference falls within the definition of cruelty at least in 
its broad sense, it should not be taken lightly by divesting it of its grave moral 
import. In his homily at Lampedusa three years ago, Pope Francis laments that 
in this globalized world “we have fallen into globalized indifference ... and have 
become used to the suffering of others.” He prays for God’s grace to enable us “to 
weep over our indifference, to weep over the cruelty of our world, of our own 
hearts, and of all those who in anonimity make social and economic decisions 
which open the door to tragic situations like this.” 22 Mercy is the key to the 
transformation of our world and our own hearts. 
 What is mercy? Augustine defines mercy as “heartfelt sympathy or compassion 
(both meaning “suffering with”) for another’s distress, impelling us to help him 
or her.”23 The bonding that we feel with a person in distress disposes us to do 
something for him or her. Mercy is an emotion that can be transformed into a 
 19 De Civ. Dei, IX, 5.
 20 STh II-II 30.3.
 21 The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, ed. H.W.Fowler and F.G.Fowler, 4th ed. 
rev. E.McIntosh (Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press, 1958), 288.
 22 Homily at Lampedusa, July 8, 2013 at http://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/
homilies/2013/documents/papa-francesco_20130708_omelia-lampedusa.html.
 23 De Civ. Dei, IX, 5.
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virtue. The process involves, in the first place, learning to make the right kind of 
judgements. Like any other emotion, mercy has a cognitive dimension in that it 
involves our capability to judge between one situation and another and respond 
in a fitting way. Speaking of compassion, Nussbaum observes that we are able to 
feel for a person’s suffering, if we are capable to judge that the suffering is serious, 
that the person does not necessarily deserve to suffer, and that we may also be in 
similar circumstances 24. But our ability to make the right kind of judgement in 
relation to the suffering of other people - and hence our capability to be merciful 
- depends on our ability to liberate ourselves from certain (negative) feelings. 
Nussbaum mentions three impediments to the formation of correct judgments 
regarding people who are in distress:25 
Shame in acknowledging that one is weak and vulnerable like everyone else. 
Being a citizen of a country, which is apparently self-sufficient, one may get the 
sense of being immune to misfortunes such as those suffered by immigrants;
Envy for those perceived as benefitting from resources to which they have 
not contributed or from opportunities to which citizens rather than outsiders 
should have a claim.
 Disgust at the outsiders as being unclean and unhealthy, taking up jobs that 
the locals would look down upon e.g. refuse/waste-collecting, or avoid as being 
too risky or too hard. Motivated by disgust, the way is wide open to what Pope 
Francis calls a culture of waste.26
Given that we may become indifferent to the misfortunes of others, we have 
to speak about compassion in a language that challenges people’s consciences. 
In fact, the language of compassion is essentially the language of “appeal” or 
call to a higher tribunal (in this case from a tribunal of justice, as articulated 
in specific codes of law, to that of a deeper sense of justice and mercy). Such 
an appeal becomes more urgent when circumstances show that the current 
social arrangements, including legal ones, are not actually being responsive 
to the plight of certain categories of people. The language of mercy is also a 
symbolic language that can activate the imagination and provoke sensitivity to 
the suffering of people. The image of Aylan Kurdi, the three-year old boy whose 
corpse was found washed up on a beach in Turkey, caught the imagination of 
millions of people around the world as it was not simply a picture of a little child 
dying in unfortunate circumstances but an emotionally highly charged symbol 
 24 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 304-327.
 25 Ibid., 342-251. How the impediments to mercy may apply to relations with immigrants is 
suggested by the author of this article.
 26 Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium (2013), no.53.
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of an ongoing tragedy.27 Similarly, as has already been noted, the picture of the 
one-year old child in the hands of that person who went to its rescue and found 
it dead can touch the heart of many people more than numbers can do. 
Pope Francis has been regularly making symbolic gestures to challenge the 
conscience of people and of States to take effective measures regarding the 
problem of immigration. Of particular symbolic significance have been his visits 
to the borders where immigrants either fail to arrive, because they die on the way, 
or are finding the doors closed and their hopes to a better future are frustrated. 
His visits to Lampedusa ( July 8, 2013), Ciudad Juarez Fair Grounds (February 
17, 2016) and his visit, together with Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, to 
the island of Lesbos (April 5, 2016) symbolically highlight one of the crucial, if 
not the crucial issue, in the world’s response to the massive waves of immigrants 
today, namely, the opening up of borders and the heeding of the cry of those 
knocking at the door.
Pope Francis understands his appeals for compassion and mercy as a process 
involving three phases: a challenge to people’s consciences that leads to reflection 
and a concrete change of heart.28 
Community: The Way of Justice 
The way of justice proceeds along two paths in as much as justice is both 
a disposition and a norm. On the one hand, it disposes the person to give the 
other his or her due. As such, it enables people to respect each other’s dignity 
and rights, ensuring a respectful distance between one person and another. On 
the other hand, justice requires society to put in place appropriate structures for 
everyone to be in a position to exercise one’s rights and participate in all aspects 
of social life. As a norm, justice specifies what kind of actions are incompatible 
with respect for each other’s dignity and rights.
Moving along the first path, justice has a crucial role to play in relation to both 
mercy and to the emotions that impede compassion. As already indicated, mercy 
would be a virtue and not merely an emotion, if it is practised in a reasonable or 
a just manner. Whatever else it may mean, it has to reflect full respect for the 
dignity and rights of the individual. Mercy for an ailing person requires care that 
is appropriate in the circumstances. The search for and giving of appropriate care 
is a matter of justice. 
 27 For story and images of the child Aylan Kurdi see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_
of_Aylan_Kurdi.
 28 See homily at Lampedusa.
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The cultivation of a sense of justice is essential for overcoming the impediments 
to compassion. Motivation by a sense of justice can purify the mind and the 
heart from a false sense of shame as well as from the distructive forces of envy 
and disgust. In this way, justice opens the way to mercy by disposing people to 
relate to each other, irrespective of individual circumstances, with respect for 
everyone’s dignity and rights.
The second path concerns the kind of actions that need to be taken on the 
individual and collective levels to allow everyone to live with dignity. Perhaps 
nobody has articulated the plight of refugees so deeply as Hannah Arendt. 
Writing on the tragic experiences of massive waves of refugees particularly 
following World War II, she brought out what she called “the perplexities of the 
rights of man.” Modern declarations of the rights of man presuppose that “being 
man,” implies forming part of the human community and as a human being 
one is entitled to a universal set of human rights: rights that are fundamental 
for a truly dignified life. She notes, however, that “the paradox involved in the 
declaration of inalienable human rights was that it reckoned with an ‘abstract’ 
human being who seemed to exist nowhere, for even savages lived in some kind 
of social order.”29 The individual could actually exercise his or her rights only as a 
member of an organized political community. 
In moving out of their country in search of refuge elsewhere - as Arendt 
points out - the refugees suffered two major losses. First of all, they lost their 
homes. This meant “the loss of the entire social texture into which they were 
born and in which they established a distinct place in the world.”30 In contrast to 
earlier migration movements, forced migrations of individuals or whole groups 
of people in modern times for political or economic reasons have had to face not 
only the loss of a home but “the impossibility of finding a new one.” The second 
loss which they suffered was the loss of government protection which in practice 
implied not just the loss of legal status in their own country but in all countries. 
Arendt sums up the plight of refugees as follows: “The calamity of the rightless 
is not that they are deprived of life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness, or of 
equality before the law and freedom of opinion - formulas which are designed to 
solve problems within given communities - but that they no longer belong to any 
community whatsoever.”31
 29 Hannha Arendt, Imperialism: Part Two of The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego, CA: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1968), 171.
 30 Ibid.,173.
 31 Ibid.,175. In 1943 Arendt wrote an insightful article on refugees in which she did not only 
reflect on the sense of loss, refugees, including herself, were experiencing in trying to integrate 
themselves in a foreign country, but also on the political consequences of the way in which 
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The plight of refugees has not lost anything of its poignancy since Arendt 
brought it up in such a forceful and touching way seventy years ago. On the 
contrary, it has become even more tragic and painful. What we should do in 
response to the plight of so many people today seeking asylum is so hard, if not 
impossible, to see, because our way of understanding justice is based on the 
general assumption that we should only talk about what is “mine” and what is 
“yours” and if we talk about what belongs to “us,” we would still assume that 
there are “insiders” and “outsiders” or those who have a right to share and those 
who do not have such a right. Things, however, would appear in a different light, 
if our way of reasoning is informed by a basic moral principle in the biblical 
tradition which in Catholic social teaching is known as “the universal destination 
of created goods.”32 God has given the earth to the entire human race, to sustain 
all people, without excluding or favouring anyone. In the biblical and Christian 
tradition, this principle is consistently invoked as a basis of the moral imperative 
to welcome and help the poor. The stranger is consistently included along with 
the widow and the poor precisely to underline the extent of the moral imperative 
to help those in need. The stranger is an outsider. To those who think exclusively 
or mainly in terms of obligations towards those inside, the outsider can have, 
at best, only very restricted and questionable claims. The divine imperative to 
welcome and help the stranger can only be understood and followed by those 
who are willing to accept that the earth, including that part which they are 
inhabiting, is “theirs” in a qualified sense, as it is always subject to the principle 
of the universal destination of created goods. 
Concluding Remark 
The visit of Pope Francis in Lesbos illustrates in a very suggestive manner 
the confluence of mercy and justice over each other. The visit was a gesture of 
mercy which, as has been already noted, has a potentially powerful symbolic 
meaning, taking place precisely at a critical point where a dangerous journey 
ends, hopefully to start again and move on to a better future. A better future, 
however, can only be secured when the immigrant is accepted to form part of a 
nations were dealing with the weaker members of society. “The comity of European peoples,” 
she wrote in conclusion, “went to pieces when, and because, it allowed its weakest member to be 
excluded and persecuted.” See Hannha Arendt, “We Refugees,” Menorah Journal, no.1 (1943): 
77. For the importance of this article for a radical rethinking of political philosophy “starting 
from the one and only figure of the refugee,” see Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on 
Politics (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
 32 Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the Social Teaching of the Church, 
English ed. (London: Burns & Oates, 2005), 86-93. 
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State that can guarantee protection of the immigrant’s rights as a human being 
and as a citizen of a political community. This is the crucial step that would be 
required not out of mercy but out of justice. In taking with him twelve refugees, 
chosen by lot, to Rome and presumably offering them citizenship of the Vatican 
State, the Pope was actually showing that acts of mercy, however important they 
may be, are effective, if they are accompanied by appropriate acts of justice on 
behalf of the victims of misfortune.
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